Britain’s relationship with Europe could bring about thedownfall of David Cameron. by Dorey, Pete
blo gs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/01/04/the-uk-conservatives-and-europe-in-2012/
Britain’s relationship with Europe could bring about the
downfall of David Cameron.
Blog Admin
The issue of Britain’s relationship with Europe was a significant factor in the downfall of both
Margaret Thatcher and John Major. Could the same come to be true of David Cameron?
Pete Dorey reflects on the UK’s Conservative Party and Europe in 2012 and what the
future might hold in 2013.
In one particular sphere of  policy, David Cameron must recently have experienced a
disconcerting sense of  déjà vu, f or he ended 2012 in a rather similar manner to how he
ended 2011; f acing a sizeable backbench rebellion over his stance towards the European
Union. Having seemingly neutralised ‘the European Question’ when he was leader of  the [Conservative]
Opposition, the issue of  Britain’s relationship with the EU acquired increasing toxicity f or Cameron during
2012, as Conservative Eurosceptism swif t ly degenerated into consumptive Europhobia. This seemed
both to ref lect and reinf orce a rapidly increasing hostility towards the EU among the Brit ish electorate,
as evinced by sundry opinion polls, and the advances attained by the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in
the by-elections held in 2012.
As 2012 progressed, the problems of  Party management which Cameron experienced over the EU began
to summon f orth memories of  John Major ’s ill- f ated premiership, when ref usal to accede to Eurosceptic
demands f or a tougher stance were condemned as a ‘sell-out’ to Brussels, whilst ceding ground to the
Eurosceptics was interpreted by them as legit imation of  their stance, and thus prompted yet more
demands f or retreating f rom the EU. As such, Britain’s increasingly f raught relations with the EU provided
Cameron with some of  the toughest challenges of  his leadership and Party management skills since May
2010.
Emboldened by the embarrassment they caused Cameron in November 2011, and cognisant that there
were f ew f easible sanctions he could impose by way of  retribution, Conservative Europhobes were
af f orded f urther opportunit ies to challenge Cameron’s own pragmatic Euroscepticism, especially as they
were convinced that they ref lected, or were leading, public opinion.
First, in a general sense, some Conservatives have readily
Ge o rg e  Osb o rne  (Cre d it: alto g e the rfo o l, CC-BY-
2.0)
First, in a general sense, some Conservatives have readily
blamed the crisis in the eurozone f or the f ailure of  the
Coalit ion Government’s austerity measures to yield quicker or
stronger economic recovery. Rather than acknowledge the
impact of  expenditure cuts, job losses and pay f reezes in
pushing the Brit ish economy to the brink of  a double-dip
recession, many Conservatives have sought somehow to
blame the eurozone crisis f or the f lat- lining of  the Brit ish
economy, the implication being that Britain’s extensive exports
to Europe are being af f ected by the crisis af f licting many
other member states, and thus choking-of f  a nascent
recovery. Thus did Chancellor George Osborne claim, in June
2012, that: ‘Our recovery – already f acing powerf ul headwinds
f rom high oil prices and the debt burden lef t behind by the
boom years – is being killed of f  by the crisis on our doorstep.’
This, of  course, rather assumed that there had been an
economic recovery to be killed of f  in the f irst place.
Second, the summer of  2012 also heralded a letter to David
Cameron, signed by 100 Conservative MPs, demanding
legislation to guarantee, af ter the next general election
(assuming that the Conservatives won, of  course), a
ref erendum ‘on the nature of  our relationship with the
European Union’, although this did not specif ically call f or
outright withdrawal. However, in October, Douglas Carswell
presented a Private Members’ Bill which did demand Britain’s withdrawal f rom the EU, this to be ef f ected
by repeal of  the 1972 European Communities Act (aka the Act of  Accession), although like most Private
Members’ Bills, Carswell’s Bill did not reach the statute book. However, his avowed purpose was to
promote the case f or Brit ish withdrawal f rom the EU, and thus apply f urther pressure on Cameron to
pledge a straightf orward ‘in/out’ ref erendum.
Third, the end of  October entailed a def eat f or the Coalit ion Government (or, rather, David Cameron)
over a parliamentary vote on the EU Budget. The Cabinet had urged Parliament to endorse its demand
that the EU Budget should be f rozen at its current level f or the f oreseeable f uture, whereas the EU
Commission was proposing a 5 per cent increase f rom next year until 2020. However, hard- line
Conservative Eurosceptics tabled an amendment demanding actual cuts in the EU Budget; this was
endorsed by 307 votes to 294, with 53 Conservative MPs supporting it in def iance of  a three- line whip,
along with the Labour Opposition – the latter clearly unable to resist mischief -making.
Although not binding on Cameron, his subsequent f ailure to achieve real cuts in the EU Budget (albeit an
unrealistic goal given the stance of  most other member states and their leaders) merely increased the
contempt of  hard- line Conservative Eurosceptics both towards Cameron, and his Liberal Democrat
Coalit ion partners – the latter believed (erroneously) to enjoy f ar more inf luence in the Cabinet than their
electoral support and parliamentary strength warrants. Indeed, a constant low-level complaint of  some
Conservative Europhobes is that Cameron has been in thrall to the pro-European Liberal Democrats –
the Clegg tail wagging the Cameron dog.
Fourth, sundry opinion polls during 2012 consistently revealed that a majority of  Brit ish people would
vote f or withdrawal f rom the EU if  given the opportunity in a ref erendum; barely a third would vote f or
Britain to remain in the EU. Of  course, how people say they would vote in a hypothetical poll is not a
reliable guide to how they would actually vote if  such a ref erendum were held. The arguments in f avour
of  continued membership may f inally be heard more clearly during a ref erendum campaign, and people’s
minds might thus be a litt le more f ocused on the serious implications of  exit ing Europe.
Fif th, in the context of  rapidly increasing Euroscepticism among the Brit ish public, UKIP has enjoyed a
steady increase in support, both in several opinion polls, and in various by-elections held during 2012. In
so doing, f urther pressure has been placed on Cameron by many deeply Eurosceptic MPs, not only
because UKIP’s increased electoral support is viewed as a barometer of  deepening public hostility
towards the EU, but also because many Conservative MPs now f ear that UKIP might deprive the
Conservatives of  several marginal seats in the next general election.
It is not that UKIP are thought likely to win any seats, but where the Conservatives are def ending narrow
‘majorit ies’, it might only require a f ew hundred disgruntled erstwhile Conservatives to switch to UKIP to
enable Labour or the Liberal Democrats to win such constituencies – as was the case in 21 seats in the
2010 election. In response to UKIP’s steadily growing support, a Conservative vice-chairman, Michael
Fabricant, urged Cameron to craf t an electoral pact, whereby UKIP would agree not to contest
Conservative marginals if  Cameron gave a cast iron promise of  an in/out ref erendum on Britain’s
continued membership of  the EU. Cameron, however, was totally dismissive of  such a proposition – as
was the leader of  UKIP, Nigel Farage.
Sixth, UKIP began posing challenges to David Cameron on non-EU issues. For example, in December
2012, UKIP declared its intention to exploit Conservative divisions over the Coalit ion Government’s plans
to legislate to permit gay marriages. Although UKIP do not have any MPs, and so cannot oppose the
proposed Bill in Parliament, Farage has vowed to appeal to grass-roots Conservative Party members and
erstwhile Tory voters who, he believes, will turn away f rom the Conservatives over this issue. Farage has
thus declared UKIP’s intention to make this a key issue in the 2014 European Parliament elections, and
especially in rural areas, where attitudes on moral and sexual issues are apparently more conservative or
tradit ional.
This threat provides an example of  how UKIP intend to expand and intensif y their campaign against
David Cameron’s Conservative Party between now and the 2015 general election – assuming the
Coalit ion lasts the f ull f ive-year term. If  the economy f ails to show clear signs of  recovery in 2013, and
this leads to a continued decline in the Conservatives’ opinion poll ratings, then UKIP might well attract
f urther support, especially as disillusioned Conservatives are no longer likely to switch to the Liberal
Democrats (as they might have done bef ore 2010).
Cameron is thus caught between a rock and a hard place. If  UKIP’s 2012 support is sustained, or even
increases, then he will f ace mounting pressure f rom a growing number of  f rustrated or panic-stricken
Conservative MPs to adopt a more hard- line stance over the EU, pref erably by pledging an ‘in/out’
ref erendum. Yet if  Cameron did respond in such a manner, then relations with the Liberal Democrats
would probably be strained even f urther, possibly placing the f uture of  the Coalit ion itself  in serious
jeopardy. Such a response might also encourage the Party’s f ew remaining prominent pro-Europeans
(such as Michael Heseltine and Kenneth Clarke) to speak out, having generally kept quiet over the EU
since 2010, in order to maintain a semblance of  Party unity. If  they perceive Cameron to be caving- in to
hard- line Eurosceptics, then pro-European Conservatives might f eel entit led to abandon their de facto
vow of  silence.
The issue of  Britain’s relationship with Europe was a major f actor in the downf all of  Margaret Thatcher
in 1990, and then her successor, John Major, in 1997, neither of  whom had to contend with the growing
threat posed by UKIP in Tory marginals. It is thus not inconceivable that the issue of  the EU could well
f atally undermine David Cameron’s premiership too during the next couple of  years. If  so, this would be
recent Conservative history repeating itself , not as tragedy, but as f arce.
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